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W E hear a lot about commercial arbitration. We learn of money spent
to insure its aggrandizement, of laws being passed to encourage
and enforce it despite opposition by the American Bar Association,1
of codes adopted under the NRA recommending its use for entire indus-
tries, and standardized contracts utilized by trade associations provid-
ing for it as the sole method for settling disputes thereafter arising 2
It is praised because of its speed, friendliness, economy and expert
justice. It is rarely damned publicly, but much that is said about it
in private conversations among the profession is far from courteous.
The more the practitioner hears of the generalized praise so commonly
current, and the more he reads the generalized propaganda treating it
as an unfailing panacea for satisfactory resolution of business con-
troversies, while simultaneously noting an ever increasing number of
particularized contested and vitiated arbitrations in the law reports,
the more puzzled he becomes. He queries: "What shall I advise my
clients regarding it?" He even worries: "May I advise them regard-
ing it, or will they act spontaneously on business editorials instead of
on legal advice?" A knowledge of how satisfactorily to answer the
first question will eliminate the necessity of the second.
There is at the outset a difference between the problem ordinarily
confronting the lawyer in his office and the lawyer at a Bar Association
convention. In his office he is concerned primarily with the advice
to be given to an individual client, with the application of certain legal
principles to a given case. In the Bar Association convention, he is,
like the student on a legal examination, more often concerned with gen-
eralized statements, and acts on a much higher plane of idealism than
is warranted-or even professionally allowable-in the ordinary advice
to a client. Whether trained in the quintessence of Frankian function-
alism or steeped in the ideology of Langdellian case-ology, the prac-
titioner, in the individual case, must become specific. His advice to a
client regarding arbitration should be based, not on utilitarian generali-
ties, but on whether or not, considering the economic factors and legal
fMember of the Boston Bar.
1. Cf. (1925) 50 A. B. A. REP. 135 et seq., 577 et seq. But d. the various reports of
the Arbitration Committee of the City of New York in 31, 37 and 39 RE'on-s or
AssocIAnox or Tn BAR or TH Crry or NEw YoRn.
2. Cf. KELLOR, AxBitATio N m NEw INDUSTRrAL Soc=r (1934) passim; Pbllip,-
Commercial Arbitration Under the NI.R.A. (1934) 1 U. or C m L. REV. 424.
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rules regarding it, it will pay his client to arbitrate or to agree to do
so in the individual case. He 'must decide: (a) shall I advise my
client to agree to arbitrate before a dispute arises, and if so what and
how; (b) shall I advise him to arbitrate after a dispute arises, and if
so, what and how; (c) what shall my advice and service be after he
has agreed to arbitrate?
To these problems we shall address ourselves. We are not concerned
with the broader merits or demerits of arbitration, except as they may
affect our individual problem. The real confusion and debate has been
caused by the fact that the sponsors of arbitration insist that it is a gen-
eral panacea for all disputes, a. grand and glorious method of business
reform, a thing to be sold by generalized propaganda and standardized
arbitration clauses. Instead, it should be treated as any other tool in
the lawyer's equipment for the settlement of business dispute, accepted
or rejected by the same balancing of factors we use in deciding upor
a trial, a reference, a settlement, an accord and satisfaction, or even
a bland admission that the antagonist is correct in his contention and
should be compensated as he contends. Doubtless, admission in every
case that one's antagonist is correct would produce frictionless business
relations, and assure speedy, quick, friendly and economical settlements
of all disputes. The same might be said for compromise. It is no more
foolish to look on these as a universal cure-all than on arbitration. But
somehow or other the word arbitration has a magic ring.
Until the last few years, advising a client to agree to arbitrate any
disputes thereafter arising out of a contract was often a nice method
of appearing to insure a peaceful solution to any and all future con-
flicts, as well as a convenient assistance in obtaining the acceptance of
the original document. "If any dispute arises later it can always be
arbitrated." Of course, our client may or may not have been advised
at the same time that regardless of the Sunday School merits of arbi-
tration the clause could be revoked with impunity.3 But in many states
to-day these clauses are absolutely enforceable; business interests have
by powerful lobbying induced the passage of statutes which on their
face make it mandatory for the court to issue an order compelling arbi-
3. It is clear that agreements to arbitrate future disputes were not specifically enforce-
able at common law, Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 800 (U. S. C. C. 1849); cf.
United States Asphalt v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
It has been authoritatively and positively laid down that only nominal damages could
be recovered for their breach. Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 102 Fed. 926 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1900); 3 WILLI so N, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1719. Some doubt has been cast on this
by a most recent case: McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Construction Co., 71 F. (2d) 17
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934). For a succinct and thorough statement of the law regarding arbi.
tration agreements see also CHIAFE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY' (1934) 537 et seq.
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tration whenever one side refuses thus to settle the dispute.4 The courts
are not permitted to refuse specific performance of arbitration on grounds
which heretofore have influenced chancellors and legal scholars to favor
refusal of equitable relief.
Nor can a lawyer in a state not possessing these statutes allow an
arbitration clause to be inserted in a contract as a sop to a complaining
antagonist or in a hope that it may prove a moral suasion to the parties
to arbitrate in cases seemingly fitted for arbitration. The new arbitra-
tion laws are being vigorously pushed, and a clause innocently enough
inserted may prove irreparably injurious at some later date, should the
local state succumb and pass these ill-considered laws. There is the
further fact that Congress has passed the United States Arbitration Act,0
applying to arbitration clauses in maritime contracts or those concerning
interstate commerce, so that an arbitration clause may prove enforceable
in the Federal courts at a time when the state courts will not enforce it.
Besides, arbitration is considered procedural from the standpoint of the
conflict of laws,7 so that if our client is served in any of the twelve
4. Amn. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §§ 4294-4301, as amended by Laws 1929, c. 72, 1-4;
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §§ 1280-93; Coxx. Gnr-. STAT. (1930) §§ 5340-56; L%.
GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 405-22; N. H. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 147; N. J. Color. STmT.
(Supp. 1925) §§ 9, 21-36; N. Y. ARBrr. LAW (1920) c. 925 §§ 1410-1431, as added by Laws
1923, c. 346 § 6-a, id. 1927, c. 352; N. Y. Civ. PRAQ ACT §§ 1448-65, 1469; Omo GEa;. CoDz
(4 Page, 1932) § 12148 (1-17); Oms. CooE ANN. (1930) §§ 21-101, 21-103, Laws 1931,
c. 36; PA. STAT. A_m. (Purdon, Supp. 1932) tit. 5, §§ 161-81; R. I. Acts and Reolves
1929, c. 1408, §§ 1-18; Wis. STAT. (1931) §§ 298.01-298.18. See Pop-in, Judcal Con-
struction of the New York Arbitration Law of 1920 (1925) 11 Cormr. L. Q. 329; Frankel,
The New York Arbitration Law (1932) 32 COL. L. Rrv. 623; Phillips, The Paradox in
Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding (1933) 46 HAr~v. L.
REv. 1258. The statutes are set forth in full detail in SrunrGs, CoanamcriL An'uAmo.v
AND AwsDS (1930), the modem American authoritative text on the subject and an ex-
haustive and excellent work. Some lower courts at times seem to remain in blisful ignor-
ance of the purport of these modem acts. Cf. Clogston v. Schiff-Lang Co. Inc., 32 P. (2d)
390 (Cal. App. 1934).
5. The arbitration acts have been held to apply to contracts executed before their
passage. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921); Pacific
Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 25 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928)
Contra: Palmer v. Fix, 104 Cal. App. 562, 571 (1930). Several of the modem acts, how-
ever, specifically exempt contracts antedating their pmage.
6. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-15 (1926). For a discusion of the problems
raised by the Act, see Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute (1927) 36 YAL L. J.
667; Baum and Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the
Federal Courts (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. R-v. 238, 428; Phillips, Arbitration and Conflicts
of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion (1934) 19 CoRn. L. Q. 197, 209 et seq.
7. Meacham v. Jamestown, etc. Ry., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914); Vitaphone
Corporation v. Electrical Research Products Inc., 19 Del. Ch. 247, 166 At. 255 (1933); 19
Del. Ch. 354, 167 AUt. 845 (1933); 171 AU. 738 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1934); (1933) 47 Hmv. L.
Rav. 126; (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1440. Contra: Hamlyn & Co. v. TalLsker DiLillery [1S94]
1934]
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
enforcing states, he may be compelled to arbitrate, and inasmuch as the
statutes provide for the absolute staying of any suit or proceeding
brought in violation of the arbitration agreement, he may find his
remedies in the courts of many states barred.8  Our clause will not be
looked at as moral suasion for arbitration in the proper cases; it will
prove to be a legal waiver of all legal rights, an "open sesame" to abso-
lute mandatorily compelled arbitration as the sole method of enforcing
a dispute or delaying its solution, regardless of the merits or demerits
of an arbitration as a means of properly effectuating the agreement.0
To look on such a device as a business toy and not a legal tool seems
inane. Furthermore, an arbitration clause should be inserted in a con-
tract only when parties intend to obey it, and a conscientious practi-
tioner should contemplate drafting only provisions which he expects his
client to insist on and observe.
The lawyer in allowing an arbitration clause to be inserted in a con-
tract must have a keen eye for the future, must visualize, as he must in'
considering all other types of clauses in a contract, what will be the
effect of this particular clause in various future contingencies. He can
not rely upon glib phrases thrown out by associations whose support is
partially furnished by the arbitrations they handle, ephemeral shib-
A. C. 202 (the English viewpoint has not, however, been accepted by any American
court). A complete discussion of the conflicts problems may be found in Heilman, Arbi-
tration Agreements and the Conflicts of Laws (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 617; Phillips, loc. cit.
supra note 6; Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration: International and Interstate Aspects
(1934) 43 YALE L. J. 716.
8. Cf., e.g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service Corporation, 70 F. (2d)
297 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Matter of Inter-ocean Food Products, Inc., 206 App. Div. 426,
201 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1923). Arbitration agreed to in one state may be ordered by the
courts of another, Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp., 170 Ati. 286
(Pa. 1934) ; Matter of Inter-ocean Food Products, Inc., supra. Contra: (1934) 47 -HAv. L.
REv. 1055. An agreement to arbitrate in a particular county of Ohio confers irrevocable
jurisdiction in the courts of that county to order arbitration to proceed. Onio Gzm. Co .
(Page, 1932) §§ 12148-8. In New York an ex parte arbitration may be had, and thus make
service against a foreign resident unnecessary. Finsilver, Still, and Moss v. Goldberg, Maas
& Co., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930). And further, an arbitration agreement may
bar one from equitable relief even in a "non-enforcing" state. Cf. Vitaphone Corporation
v. Electrical Research Products, Inc., 171 Atl. 738 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1934). In all, the con-
sequences of an arbitration provision may be severe.
9. The delay results in many instances from motions to stay an action brought in
violation of an agreement to arbitrate. It is possible for defendants to utilize the stay
in unethical ways, and dilatory chicanery is very common. See an examination of the
cases and practise in Phillips, supra note 6, at 205 et seq. A statement in a recent arbitra-
tion decision is most instructive: "By tradition a defendant may ordinarily let a sleeping
dog lie until he is bitten. Though he may play with the danger too long." Matter of
Haupt v. Rose, 265 N. Y. 108, 111, 191 N. E. 853 (1934). Cf. Murian Frocks, Inc, v.
Malamor Dress Corp., 152 Misc. 304 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1934). An arbitration clause
seems to assist the sleeping process, and permit much play without danger.
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boleths about speed, justice, economy and friendliness, any more than
he can ignore the Rule against Perpetuities because his client has been
persuaded by a bulletin of the Animal Welfare League that he ought to
tie up property for the semi-eternal benefit of Maltese cats.
We cannot ignore the fact, for example, that the nature of arbitration
has changed in recent years. To the Middle Age merchant, and in fact
up to the time of our modern arbitration acts, the process was more or
less a friendly method of settlement of disputes. Awards were com-
promises; and arbitrators were agents whose authority in effect was
limited to securing a settlement which both sides would willingly accept.
To compel "arbitration" as used in that sense borders on the grotesque.
But arbitration as visualized by modern proponents of the movement,
arbitration such as results when an entire industry agrees that disputes
should be thus settled, arbitration by which one preempts his right to
secure a court disposition of any possible dispute which may thereafter
arise between the parties, is no longer a simple agency-compromise, it is
a substitute for the courts, termed quasi-judicial by its proponents; 1
which probably means judicial in result, judicial in its nature, non-judi-
cial in its judges.'1 The question therefore which the practitioner must
consider at the very outset is not: "Am I providing a possible method for
avoiding law suits?" but "Shall I provide a method of trial other than
the courts for disputes which may arise and need adjudication, and shall
I preclude my client from any remedy other than abitration for the
adjudication of the disputes involved?"
Of course, as arbitration clauses are "sold" today, they are so general
in their nature as to preempt any kind of court action. For example,
the American Arbitration Association recommends the following clause
in business contracts:
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the Rules,
then obtaining, of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon
the award may be entered in the highest court of the forum, state or federal,
having jurisdiction."' 2
A careless practitioner, unaware of the pitfalls which lie in its use,
may accept it; but it is submitted that before a general arbitration clause
is inserted (in an enforcing state or where there is any possibility of
enforcement) counsel must do a great deal of research and consider his
10. CODE OF AtITRATION: PRAcnSE AZZD PROCEnURE (1931) 7S. Cf. Fidelity & Daptit
Co. v. Woltz, 234 App. Div. 823, 253 N. Y. Supp. 583 (4th Dep't, 1931); Iaas, Two
Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 40 EAIv. L. REv. 929.
11. "Arbitrators are a law unto themselves and may decide according to their via2u
of justice." Mayberry v. Mayberry, 121 N. C. 248) 250, 28 S. E. 349 (1897).
12. CODE Or ARBrAnON: PRAcncr AND PaocmuRE (1931) 46, 205.
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client's case most carefully. Of course, the same holds true with regard
to any standardized document, but to a much lesser degree; for courts
will examine other kinds of standardized documents and disregard
onerous provisions which they deem to be against public policy. Arbi-
tration clauses, on the other hand, may prevent the courts from passing
upon and perhaps moderating harsh substantive provisions of a con-
tract.13 Business arbitrators approach cases from an individual and not
from a social viewpoint; and provisions which a court would cast aside
are only too readily enforced by them. 4
Another disadvantage attending the use of a general arbitration clause
is the lessened predictability of the legal consequences of the contract con-
taining it. Many relationships are entered into wherein security of
transaction and certainty of result are far more important to the con-
tracting parties than any other single factor. Business dealings in gen-
eral rest on possible future predictability. In a long-term lease, for
instance, or a contract for the manufacture of merchandise to be de-
livered at some future time, an accurate prediction of the rights to be
acquired and duties to be observed is a transcendent prerequisite. Codes
of Fair Practice have attempted to increase certainty in business rights.
And the law in general is an aid to predictability. But although en-
forceable arbitration clauses are alleged to make for easy credit and for
stabilization in business relations,15 in reality they introduce tremendous
uncertainty in the law that is to be applied to the disputes which may
arise. Whether functional or conceptualistic in their approach to law,
most counsel are generally egotistical enough to believe that they can
accurately predict how the judge will find the law, whether because of
their knowledge of psychology and the hidden motives which prompt
judge-made wisdom or because of their acquaintance with the guiding
principles upon which all judges act. Cases and precedents are examined
13. Cf. (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 699.
14. This statement regarding the "nature of the arbitral process" is, in our opinion,
incapable of actual proof. It is the result of attendance at many arbitrations, and a
careful study of the records of many others. Unfortunately, such records are private,
and unavailable for publication. We could, for example, point to an entire New York
City industry which habitually uses arbitration, where a vicious limitation of liability
provision in the standardized contract in a form legally invalid is sustained almost without
exception by arbitrators.
Everything about the proceeding makes for individual and not social justice., Awards
are private, arbitrators are encouraged to give no reasons for their decisions, and no precedents
are cited to or by them. Their whole attention is on the case. Their business training anl
their business logic is in its very nature individualistic and their decisions not based on
social policy, but on the facts before them. Cf. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930).
15. See Grossman, Trade Security Under Arbitration Laws (1926) 35 Yt, L. J. 308.
[Vol. 44
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
before contracts are drawn. Printed law reports are evidence of what
courts may do in similar cases. But there are no records to show the prin-
ciples by which the individual arbitrator will act. He is a law unto him-
self. His inspirational decision on law is unpredictable, unassailable, un-
reviewable. 1' Far better it may be to have no contract at all than to have
lay judges misinterpret carefully drawn clauses drafted expressly to
conform to case law already decided. Accordingly, if the prime requisite
is certainty, the lawyer may well hesitate to permit an arbitration clause
to cover such of the issues as demand definite predictability. The mod-
ern declaratory judgment statutes have gone far toward providing a
succinct method of ascertaining disputed rights in advance; we should
think twice before placing in a contract a clause which will forever for-
bid their use.' We should deliberate carefully before providing in effect
that the law applicable to a future dispute is not the law which our
training has equipped us to know; but rather the home-made inspira-
tional logic of the individual arbitrator who, appointed at some future
time, ad hoc, may be fortunate or unfortunate enough to sit in judgment
of our client.
So, too, we may desire to protect our client's rights against an un-
scrupulous fellow business man by means of a provisional remedy. In-
junction or attachment are very effective methods for the speedy col-
lection of just debts. Receivership is a puissant factor in preventing an
unfair disposition of assets. Mechanics' liens are a practical protection
in building contracts. Under almost all the modern arbitration acts the
agreement precludes these remedies; the entire sphere of court control,
once the agreement is made, is spent in ordering arbitration and in staying
any other type of proceeding which may be brought."8 This too should
16. For a discussion of the various rules and cases regarding arbitrators following
rules of law see Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Cornmerdal Arbitration (1934)
47 HARv. L. REv. 590. The common law rule codified into most of our modern American
statutes allows no court review of rulings of law by the arbitrators, and their rulings thereon
are final regardless of their departure from accepted legal principles. There are some
states which do not follow this rule. See the unusually critical statement in Matter of
Couperie Beige Americaine, N. Y. L. J., January 19, 1934, at 307, and cf. SEco:n Rmo=
or = TrEXs Crvm JuDIcAL CoUNcIL (1930) 101-109.
17. Cf. Newburger v. Lubell, 257 N. Y. 383, 178 N. E. 669 (1931). The only declara-
tory judgment which could be granted when the contract contains a general arbitration
clause would be that the parties are bound to arbitrate. Cf. Matter of Flinthote, N. Y.
L. J., May 5, 1933, at 2717. Note also that the mere fact that a complaining party has
no case at law, is no good reason for the denial of a motion compelling arbitration
under the modern acts. For the courts cannot say how the arbitrators will find the law, nor
say that a bona fide dispute is not sufficient for a motion to compel. Cf. Matter of
Palmer & Pierce, 195 App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't, 1927); Matter of
Wenger & Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 239 N. Y. 199, 146 N. E. 203 (1924).
18. Cf. Phillips, supra note 4, at 1267 et seq.; 48 R1ronTs or THE Assocz&Txon 02 m
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be a powerful consideration in determining whether our advice should
be towards arbitration clauses in any particular contract.
These two serious deficiencies in the arbitration process make us mind-
ful that we must glance at the generalized reasons which might prompt us
to include an arbitration clause in a contract. Why should we prefer this
method of trial to that in the courts? The only possible answer is that
our court procedure fails to provide satisfactory tribunals for business
men, and that an arbitration can remedy the deficiencies.
The proponents of arbitration point out that its speed is so tremendous
that the delay in court procedure stands out startlingly by compari-
son. Is our particular contract the type in which a speedy solution is
imperatively demanded; are certainty and provisional remedies to be
sacrificed to gain speed? For example, in the case of a contract for the
sale of perishable commodities or for the importation of merchandise
where duty refunds or protest at commissions' rulings must be claimed
immediately, an assurance of a speedy disposition of disputes is far more
essential than any other factor. But-can arbitration provide it? Un-
doubtedly it can if the parties are agreed that an arbitration shall be held;
but if they are not, experience under the compulsory arbitration statutes
would indicate that astute counsel can delay proceedings with as much
success as in an ordinary law suit.'9  As a matter of fact, if both parties
are willing to cooperate, a law suit can be speedy; even in our cities
where dockets are crowded to a point of disgrace to our legal system,
speedy trial by reference or by submission of agreed statement of facts
can be obtained by normal legal process. But in most cases defendants
are in no hurry to settle. And these same defendants will be in no hurry
to arbitrate, and instead of prolonging the trial on the merits of the
dispute, they will prolong the enforcement of the agreement by the
courts and delay the arbitration by means of the same type of selfishness
that delays lawsuits. Our courts and our Bar cannot be expected to
lose that odd sense of formalism and technicality so wrongfully rampant
in procedural formality merely because an arbitration, and not a busi-
BAR OF TE Crry oF Naw YORK (1925) 135; Louis Michel Inc. v. Whitecourt Construction
Co., 264 N. Y. 23, 189 N. E. 767 (1934). See In re Louis Michel Inc., 238 App. Div, 480,
265 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1st Dep't, 1933); Brescia Construction Co. v. Walart Construction
Co., 264 N. Y. 260, 190 N. E. 484 (1934), aff'g 238 App. Div. 45, 263 N. Y. Supp, 13 (1st
Dep't, 1933).
19. See, e.g., Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Co., the legal vagaries of which can
be partially found in: 215 App. Div. 759, 212 N. Y. Supp. 869 (1st Dep't, 1925); 7 F.
(2d) 511 (S. D. N. Y. 1925); 11 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); 226 App. Div, 397,
235 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't, 1929); 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929); 253 N. Y.
534 (1930); 282 U. S. 808 (1930); Vitaphone Corporation v. Electrical Research Products,




ness dispute, is made the subject of court process, at least not so long
as their business clients lend every encouragement to the delay. And
the delay in an arbitration is not always traceable to the parties or their
counsel:
"Is the Queen's Bench dilatory? More so than it ought to be, I admit. But
at any rate Her Majesty's judges have no interest in prolonging the proceed-
ings which cannot be said of lay arbitrators whose remuneration expands with
the length of their sittings."20
The catalogue of advantages claimed for arbitration has been by
no means exhausted. Perhaps the contract is one in which utmost
privacy is demanded. For example, an actress, press-agented as salaried
at $2,500 a week, is completely satisfied with and has contracted for $250
a week. Even though a dispute should arise on the contract, neither
party would care to divulge how John Q. Public was misled. A suit,
however, would easily do so. Furthermore, publicity regarding other
kinds of suits is often ruinous; an attack on quality of merchandise,
even though it is later found to be of unequaled merit, is harmful to
future sales. Arbitration can prevent this. Is our contract of this sort?
But the arbitration must be held without a court order if it is to achieve
privacy; once a court order is asked for, the attendant publicity is just
as great as in a law suit. And voluntary arbitrations are not always
clouded with a veil of secrecy; witness, for example, the famous decision
wherein the newspapers proclaimed that arbitrators decided that a baby
was not "an act of God"-which incidentally was not held by the arbi-
trators, but advanced by counsel and reported perhaps by him to the
papers. So that even if the utmost secrecy is necessary, it can be obtained
only if both parties wish to keep the secret in the individual case.
Then it may be that the parties operate on such a small margin of
profit, that the cost of a law suit will mean that even the winner Will lose.
Here too, arbitration is held out as a panacea. Cheap, certainly, if both
parties willingly consent to the process; cheap, certainly, if arbitrators
can be found who will serve at a nominal rate of compensation; cheap,
if it is not dragged around in courts for years as can be done; but a
clause in the contract is no guarantee of cheapness if the parties later
on should care to prolong the proceeding. There is ample evidence that
bitterly contested arbitrations can be as expensive as bitterly contested
law suits.2
20. Pickstone, Fallacy of Arbitration (1896) 101 L. T. 557. In all fairness it sbould
be pointed out that the American Arbitration Association in arbitrations held under its
rules provides arbitrators who serve without compensation.
21. Cf. Vitaphone Corporation v. Electrical Research Products Corporation, sup'a
note 7, an arbitration proceeding costing $750,000; Everett v. County of Erie, 148 Miac.




The advocates of arbitration point out that it is a voluntary proceed-
ing; that good feeling is prevalent throughout; that future trade will not
be lost because of the acrimonious attitude so closely bound up with our
adversary system of litigation. True enough, if the parties willingly
arbitrate; but after all there is nothing voluntary about a coerced arbi-
tration. Thus, our arbitration clause provides no guarantee of friendly
relations in the future; it merely makes possible two steps of acrimoni-
ousness instead of one, a contentious proceeding to enforce arbitration,
and a contentious arbitration. There are few disputes over the right to
hold a law suit as such, for proper service of process prevents that; there
may be many over the holding of the particular arbitration.
And so we could take each and every advantage claimed in general for
arbitration and show that the advantage exists only as long as the
parties care to arbitrate the particular case. Certainly, if they do care to
arbitrate, they can agree to do so after the dispute has arisen; and in
almost every state such an agreement is irrevocable. Counsel must there-
fore consider the facts of the case and find some compelling reason before
agreeing in advance to waive certainty, to waive provisional remedies, In
return for possible friendliness, cheapness, privacy, speed, which will
exist only if the parties still desire to arbitrate after a dispute arises.
Looking at the matter realistically, the paramount and only indis-
putable advantage in arbitration consists in the "expert fact finders" one
can obtain to act as judges. The point is often emphasized, but it is too-
provocative of thought to be amenable to good advertising purposes.
Business facts are complicated. Business relationships are obscure ex-
cept to those well versed in their intricacies. The ordinary uninformed
jury is completely at sea, and oftentimes the legally trained judge is
unable properly to decide business fact so necessary to a just result in
any controversy. Are furs up to sample? A jury cannot even guess in-
telligently; a judge's mental equipment will not help him decide it; a
fur expert acting as an impartial arbitrator knows almost at a glance.
An explosion occurs in an oil field; the fault is alleged to be a defective
pump. The manufacturer denies it was defective. Is he liable? The
question raised in such a case could baffle engineers; an examination of
such a problem, which would produce a doze for even the liveliest judge
and a sound sleep for an ordinary jury, would prove a thrilling experience
to engineer arbitrators. If permitted to decide the case, they might be
expected to reach a scientific as well as a just result. Of course, if the
arbitrators are to be appointed by a court as a result of a legal motion,
the probabilities are that the arbitrators will not be experts; but even in
a "compelled" arbitration, there are methods, as will be pointed out here-
after, which will assure expert judges.
The securing of an expert judge is a reality for which arbitration could
(Vol. 44
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stand, the thing for which, we presume, business men turn to it in
many instances and for which arbitration would be utilized even if we
had speedy, cheap and adequate trial sessions. This is what the lawyer
must take account of at the start when the client consults him with regard
to an arbitration clause. What business facts are likely to be disputed in
the course of future dealings which can be determined expertly by arbi-
trators, and cannot properly be decided by courts? These should be
arbitrated; and the arbitration clause should be clearly and specifically
limited to thefm. The same holds true for those "legal" questions which
concern "trade custom." What are they? When do they seem likely to
arise? These are questions which must be clearly thought through be-
fore the arbitration clause is advised and adopted. To these it should
apply; to these it should be limited.
Thus properly limited, the arbitration clause will prove in most in-
stances of inestimable value and will escape the drawbacks heretofore
mentioned. If the clause be confined to certain types of disputes-the
proper, carefully considered types-provisional remedies and equitable
relief will still be obtainable. Astute counsel may always find some mat-
ter outside the scope of the clause upon which to base his prayer for
necessary relief; careful counsel will provide for such relief in his
clause. No difficulty will be encountered with predictability; for arbitra-
tion, thus limited, will not concern itself with the type of legal rules upon
which the parties need the settled decisions of the courts as their guide.
As a matter of fact, when arbitration is properly limited, the necessity
of court compulsion will fast disappear in most instances. Few, if any,
would resist arbitration on an issue which everyone admits should be
fairly submitted to arbitration. The proper clause will furnish the
needed moral suasion, and settlement of this type of dispute in and of
itself will prevent future litigation on more general lines. Refusal to
arbitrate such issues as were carefully thought of when the contract was
made, issues concerning business fact or business custom, would brand
as a sham a defense to a motion compelling arbitration in most instances.
But this is not true in the case of a general clause providing for arbi-
tration of all disputes. Where, for example, a claim may later be made
that there was fraud in the procurement of the contract, or that the
contract was rescinded or abrogated, or a controversy may arise concern-
ing the interpretation of terms or concerning complicated rules of law,
or a need for equitable relief may make itself felt, the English courts
could hold there was good reason for not enforcing arbitration;2 but
22. E.g., fraid: Barnes v. Youngs, [18981 1 Ch. 414; Wallis v. Hirsch, 26 L. J. C. P.
72 (1856), cf. Arbitration Act 1934, § 14(2); re-scission: Davis v. Starr, 41 Ch. Div. 242
(1889); Modern Road Construction Co. Ltd. v. Melbourne Harbour Trust Comnmiisioners,
[1932] Vict. L. R. 275 (Ct. of App.). But cf. Matter of Collihawv, 211 App. Div. E09
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the American courts are not, according to the modern arbitration acts,
thus allowed to refuse an order compelling arbitration or to stay an
action giving necessary relief. Yet in this sort of case, one need not be
a keen student of psychology to perceive that the parties did not foresee
even the possibility of such a dispute when the contract was entered
into; it requires no more than normal insight to realize that the settle-
ment of claims and disputes such as these is not conducive to good feeling,
that they are not really fitted for arbitration, that in fact they are of the
type which will not be arbitrated if the other party can prevent it. But
the converse is true of properly limited types of disputes; and except
in cases where parties are of low moral responsibility, arbitration will
willingly be accepted. Of course, parties of low moral responsibility
will always hedge and stoop to dilatory tactics; with them it is just as
well to utilize the law in its full rigor, instead of extra-judicial tribunals.
But suppose you represented a client who signed a contract under
which his rights at law were clear; suppose you were absolutely certain,
because of the facts and the language in the contract, that he was
clearly in the right and needed provisional relief. Ask yourself how you
would feel to allow a board of arbitrators who are not bound to find
according to law, who cannot grant provisional remedies, who perhaps
may compromise, who may find totally against you, to pass on his rights.
Would it be any wonder if your client asked to resist arbitration and to
obtain a trial at law? Or suppose the contract were of the "take it or
leave it" variety, foisted on your client in the course of trade, contain-
ing terms which the court would not enforce because of social policy
but which arbitrators invariably would? Would you complacently sit
by and willingly submit to arbitration when you realized your client
had unthinkingly been "sold" arbitration as a commodity, not as a legal
tool? Would you talk in terms of abstract platitudes to him and
remind him of the speed, justice and economy of arbitration in general?
You should not be too discouraged, however, if such a client comes
to you with an all inclusive arbitration clause after a dispute has arisen
in a case in which arbitration is an ill fitted remedy, and for which the
courts are clearly superior. The English courts recognize this as a
suitable ground for revocation of an arbitration agreement, though prima
facie the duty of the court would be to hold otherwise. 3 If other states
(1924) ; interpretation of terms: Printing Machinery Co. Ltd. v. Linotype & Machinery Ltd.,
[19121 1 Ch. 566; complicated legal problems, East & West India Dock Co. v. Kirk & Randall,
12 A. C. 738 (1887); Robert Davis Workman v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners, [18991
2 I. R. 234.
23. See, e.g., Lyon v. Johnson, 40 Ch. D. 579 (1889); Joplin v. Postlethwalte, 61 L. T.
R. 629 (Ct. App. 1889) ; Zalinoff v. Hammond, [1898] 2 Ch. 92. When there is need of relief
such as equity alone can give, the English courts may disregard the arbitration provisions;
e.g., Jack v. Bell, 36 Sol. J. 760 (Ct. App. 1892); cf. Pini v. Rancoroni, [1892] 1 Ch. 633.
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follow New York in its interpretation of the modern arbitration law, they
wMll overlook the mandatory wording of the modern arbitration act, and,
while rendering lip service to the grandmotherly solicitude of the legis-
lature, find methods to avoid benevolent compulsion of an allegedly
voluntary act. The New York courts have developed an amazing series
of anomalous technicalities2 4 in connection with motions to order arbitra-
tion, and these are sometimes available to counsel if he has a case which
he honestly believes ill fitted for it. And similarly, an award which is
"too" contrary to law and fact may be vacated by the self-same methods.
To be sure, such an award will call forth positive judicial statements that
the rulings of the arbitrators are final both as to law and fact, and unre-
viewable by the courts; but strong statements to this effect are at times
immediately followed with quaint trivialities which cause the court to
overthrow the award. Richard Meinig Co. v. Katakura & Co. Ltd.2
contains a remarkable dictum, which "lets us in" on the judicial sub-
conscious. There an award was attacked on the ground that the arbi-
trator was "prejudiced as a matter of law." The court after long dis-
cussion overruled the contention, sustained the award and then added
this tell-tale gem:
"While we are not (I) concerned with the merits of the controversy, never-
theless, we feel it is only fair to say that an examination of the exhibits and
other proof indicates quite dearly that a proper disposition of the questions
involved was made by... the board of arbitrators."
Counsel can rn afford to rely on the rather positive statements con-
tained in professional brochures about the finality and certainty of arbi-
tration agreements and awards. By proper logic--shall we say-he may
still be able to obtain justice for his client. We do not ordinarily approve
of foolish technicality, but we get an inward glow of satisfaction when
we see the courts evade a statute passed in a vicious form by a somewhat
bewildered legislature at the high-powered lobbying behest of sincere,
but none the less erroneous, business philosophers turned legopanaceans.
Nevertheless, the technicalities are not always availing; they are of
necessity unreliable. But if counsel is convinced arbitration is "dead
wrong" and unfair to his client, he should not give up hope.
We see nothing unethical in advising a client who has previously agreed
to arbitrate all disputes thereafter arising out of a contract, to seek
court relief when it is clear that the contingency which arises was not
24. See the citation of cases in Phillips, supra note 4; (1934) 47 HMnv. L. REv. 699,
1055; Legis. (1934) id. at 1036, 1041-44.
25. 241 App. Div. 406, 272 N. Y. Supp. 735 (Ist Dep't, 1934). We have heretofore
attempted to develop cases showing how awards may be overturned when palpably con-
trary to law and fact. Phillis, supra note 16, at 607 et seq.
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thought of when arbitration was agreed to, and when it is clear that
arbitration is not the proper remedy to apply to the case. In the first
place, when it was agreed to, it was assumed to be a friendly, speedy,
cheap, expeditious method of adjudication. If facts are such that it
cannot prove to be that any longer, it seems foolish to preserve the empty
shell, to continue a proceeding in name alone an arbitration, merely for
the form of an agreement and not for its substance. 20  Furthermore, in
such cases there seems to be much support for the old philosophy that it
is against public policy to "oust courts of their jurisdiction," by general
arbitration clauses.
Interestingly enough, in most states not having modern arbitration
laws, where general arbitration agreements are held to be revocable, a
properly drawn arbitration clause, limited in its scope to factual disputes
and not applying to ultimate liability, is held to be irrevocable.21 Accord-
ingly, by properly limiting a clause, counsel may obtain an almost uni-
versally enforceable arbitration; but if a generalized one is used, no one
except a modern Delphic Oracle or a student in a law examination can
predict what vicissitudes it may encounter. The limited clauses, unlike
the general ones, are said not to "oust courts of their jurisdiction." The
"ouster" objection may be a bit inartistically worded; certainly no one
would object to the voluntary settlement of cases out of court. But
that courts should be forced to refuse their aid when it is needed, that
they should be compelled to stand idly by and dissipate their energies
ordering parties to stay out of court and to obtain justice by means of
an arbitration proceeding which cannot provide it, is a bit tragic, if not
against public policy. What is counsel's function if not to obtain justice
by fair trial for his client? What purpose do our courts serve, if not to
act as best they can in cases in which their services are imperatively
needed? Private tribunals are well worth while in their place, but when
they can no longer furnish the advantages which are claimed for them,
when they no longer can dispense justice, it is the duty of courts to step
in and adjudicate the disputes between the parties. 8
When previous to a dispute the parties have not agreed to arbitrate,
little difficulty arises. Counsel is easily able to weigh the factors in
26. When an arbitration for any reason proves abortive the English courts will dis-
regard the arbitration agreement. See Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, [18941 A. C.
202; Cameron v. Cuddry, [1914] A. C. 651, 656. And cf. Norwich Union Fire Insurance
Society v. Cohn, 68 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); Johnson v. Crawford, 212 Pa. 502,
506, 507, 61 At1. 1103 (1905).
27. See Jones v. Enoree Power Co., 92 S. C. 263, 75 S. E. 452 (1912), and the many
cases cited by STURGES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 71 et seq.; see also Blodgett Co. v. Bobe
Co., 190 Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38, 26 A. L. R. 1070 (1923). But see Hartford Conn. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N. W. 746 (1902).
28. See note 23, supra.
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favor of and against an arbitration, and except when thought mutually
advantageous the dispute will be otherwise settled. We have heretofore
stated many factors which will be pertinent. If parties are friendly and
level-headed enough after a dispute arises to agree to arbitration, the
proceeding will generally be carried through immediately with much
speed and satisfaction. Should only the issues needing "expert judges"
be submitted? That depends upon the needs of the individual case;
counsel will be able to balance the necessary considerations as they are
presented. It would indeed be an unusual situation were only some
parts of the dispute submitted to arbitration, and the remainder made
the subject of an action. In the nature of things it is unlikely that this
would happen or be agreed to. For generally the solution of the factual
difficulties will end the dispute; if they are not of that nature, the sub-
mission will not be entered into in normal cases. And submission agree-
ments made in proper form are almost universally enforceable by the
courts. 9
It is queer that the advocates of commercial arbitration have made
light of submissions of existing disputes. They say an agreement to
arbitrate rarely can be obtained after a dispute arises. This may be an
indictment of the arbitration process itself; it may be an indictment of
business men for being actuated by personal reasons in refusing to sub-
mit, but at least it is not an indictment of the law. It seems strange
that if arbitration is all its sponsors claim for it, the parties to a dis-
pute will not agree to it after a dispute arises. The English experience
shows that they do, in cases of a type needing it for their solution. 3
The difficulty in the generalized arbitration clause sold in advance by
generalized catchwords is that it compels arbitration in cases where, if
the parties had knowledge of all the facts, as they do when they enter
into a submission of an existing dispute, they would under no circum-
stances agree to arbitrate.
There are many points of detail which a lawyer should consider after
he has decided on arbitration. The arbitration agreement should be
carefully drafted.31 This includes more than mere language. An arbi-
29. Cf. CnAEE AND Sxmrsox, CAsEs ON EQury (1934) 552 et seq.; STurEs, Co-: c1r.c
ARmrnRATiox Aim AwARDs (1930) C. VII.
30. "Finally there is a well confirmed tradition among business men, even though
there is no written contract covering a particular dispute, to submit differences to arbitra-
tion after they have arisen." Rosenbaum, Commerdal Arbitration in England (1916)
BuL. XII Am. JuD. Soc. 7.
31. The decisions of courts interpreting arbitration clauses under the modern arbitra-
tion laws where even the slightest ambiguity can be alleged, are most unusual, conflicting,
and generally puzzlingly restrictive. E.g., see Young v. Crescent Co., 240 N. Y. 244,
148 N. E. 510 (1925); Smith Fireproof Construction Co. v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 247
N. Y. 277, 160 N. E. 369 (1928); Matter of Mlarchant v. Mlead-Morrison Affg. Co., 252
1934]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tration to be successful needs careful administration, impartial arbi-
trators, and an assurance that there will be no lapses in the proceeding.
Lawyers are as a rule too busy to attend to the administrative details,
clients too uninformed as to what is necessary, arbitrators too uninter-
ested as well as busy to see that they are performed. And the adminis-
trative details are many: sending notices of hearings, arranging therefor,
providing hearing rooms, and so forth; and lack of proper administration
may result in an invalid award and future litigation. 2 Trade associations
are available to tend to such matters for a nominal charge and should if
possible be utilized.
The services of trade associations or associations specializing in arbi-
trations, such as Chambers of Commerce or the American Arbitration
Association, can be employed for purposes other than the administration
of detail. If the parties have provided merely for arbitration, it is
almost inevitable that disputes will arise regarding the procedure to be
followed in the process itself. For example, difficulties will arise con-
cerning the method to be followed in selection of arbitrators, regarding
the times the hearings should be held, the rules of evidence to be fol-
lowed, adjournments and so forth. To provide for all the possible con-
tingencies in the contract would require a most bulky document and
would necessitate much experience on the part of the drafting attorney.
Furthermore the provisions would be so complicated and technical that
such contractual control is generally impractical. Fortunately many
trade and arbitration associations have rules for the conduct of an
arbitration which can be utilized,33 and which may be made legally
binding in most instances through incorporation by reference in the arbi-
tration clause or submission agreements. 4 Without them, arbitration
N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929); Matter of General Footwear Corp. v. Lawrence Leather
Co., 252 N. Y. 577, 170 N. E. 149 (1929); Stange v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 261 N. Y.
37, 184 N. E. 485 (1933); Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N. Y. 130, 190 N. E. 208 (1934);
In re Lehman, 269 N. Y. Supp. 940 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'g Lehman v. Ostrovsky, N. Y. L. 3.,
January 3, 1934, at 31, col. 1; cf. Katakura & Co. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co.,
307 Pa. 544, 161 At. 529 (1932). But cf. J. H. Leavenworth & Sons, Inc. v. Kimble, 157
Miss. 462, 128 So. 354 (1930); (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 699.
32. Cf., e.g. Blakely Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 134 Ga. 139, 67
S. E. 389 (1910); Karapschinsky v. Rothbaum, 177 Mo. App. 91, 163 S. W. 290 (1914);
Kopp v. Grobart, 12 N. J. Misc. 488, 172 At. 733 (1934).
33. ' A very complete collection of such arbitration rules may be found in YEAR Booz
OF CO1£MMERcIAL ARBITRATION (1927). See also BATES, PLEADING, PRACTISE, PARTIES AND FORMS
(4th ed. 1932) 809, for an ingenious device to eliminate the necessity of trade association ad-
ministration by providing an impartial lawyer to attend to all administrative detail. The
device in addition lays down an excellent procedural guide for the conduct of an arbitration,
and like trade association rules may be incorporated by reference into an arbitration agree-
ment.
34. A citation and discussion of cases and authorities supporting and enforcing rules
may be found in Phillips, supra note 16, at 619 et seq. It should be noted that the parties
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even in a properly chosen case may well turn into a quibble over pro-
cedure; and such disputes almost always lead to future litigation con-
cerning the merits of the proceeding and frequently court nullification
of the award.35 With proper rules, if the right type of question is sub-
mitted, the proceeding should be orderly, and lapses in the proceeding
through neglect by the parties of the necessary steps may be cured by the
administrative agency acting on their behalf. If questions by any chance
arise concerning the interpretation of the rules, an arbitration committee
will generally be present to resolve the controversy. But the rules must
be carefully selected in the first place; many of them are poor and Will
cause more difficulties than they solve. Others are excellent and facilely
workable. Care should be taken that the secretary of the association is
well informed on arbitration procedure and is of absolute honesty; for on
him, rather than on letter-head officials of the organization, the burden
of administration will fall.36 Proper rules backed by proper administra-
tion will assist immeasurably in making any proper arbitration a success.
Counsel's problem is to decide upon the right rules in advance.
The most important personages in an arbitration are not the parties,
nor their attorneys. It is the arbitrators who hold the place of honor.
Upon them rests the ultimate responsibility. In the past the method
commonly used for their selection was for each party to appoint one
arbitrator, these two to appoint a third. Despite positive language by
appellate courts about the necessity of impartial arbitrators, T they must
have known, as former practising attorneys, that the method of selection
made this an impossible ideal. Arbitrators thus appointed by the parties
are selected usually because they are advocates. Thus in practice the
have a wide range for contractual control over the arbitration procedure. The Arbitra-
tion Acts lay down a few procedural requirements, but these, and those evolved by the
courts, may be modified by contract when necesary. Thus, well drawn rules, in addi-
tion to creating a definite procedure for situations not covered by law, can avoid legal
rules for the conduct of arbitration which are not in accord with busine- practizze or the
needs of the individual case. Cf. Christenson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 193 Cal. 6S5, 247
Pac. 207 (1897).
35. Cf., e.g., Tutien v. Hudson Valley Coal & Coke Co., 230 App. Div. 419, 245 N. Y.
Supp. 125 (1st Dep't, 1930), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 530, 177 N. E. 127 (1931) (method of selec-
tion of arbitrators); Thornton v. Thornton, 154 Ky. 692, 159 S. W. 532 (1913) (adjourn-
ments); Berizzi v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925) (rules of evidence). It
should not be supposed that good rules will always avoid such disputes, but they can
go far in doing so. Cf. Matter of Gerli, 258 N. Y. 434, 180 N. E. 243 (1932); Slinner,
Cook & Babcock v. Fourth Church of Christ, Scientist, 238 App. Div. 573, 264 N. ".
Supp. 812 (1st Dep't, 1933); In re Albert, 146 Misc. 811, 262 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct.
1932).
36. See Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Colo. 615, 34 Pac. 175 (1893).
37. Cf. People v. Lindsey, 86 Colo. 458, 283 Pac. 539 (1929); Matter of American Eagle
Fire Insurance Co. v. New Jersey Insurance Co., 240 N. Y. 398, 148 N. E. 562 (1925).
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"third man" became an umpire and willingly accepted any compromise
which the advocates could arrive at. Occasionally the three did render
a clear cut decision on the merits, but no one expected that they would.
Accordingly, many lawyers condemned and shunned "arbitration"
on the ground that it usually resulted in a compromise. Certainly it
is in general rather fantastic to agree in advance, in a contract which
aims at the establishment of definite rights, to settle all disputes by a
device which always results in a compromise. There may, however, be
occasions where this is the proper expedient. For example, merchants
who have done continuous business with each other over a long period
of time may want to compromise their disputes but may be too proud
to do their own compromising. They can preserve their self-respect by
allowing "arbitrators" to do it for them. In such a case, arbitration by
two advocates and an umpire should be provided for. In the normal
case, however, when compromise is the proper method for the settlement
of a dispute it can be effected by the parties and counsel's own efforts
without going through all the trouble of an arbitration. The condemna-
tion of all arbitration as compromise is, however, no more justified than
the propagandists' generalized praise. For an arbitration is very different
where the arbitrators are impartial experts, interested in determining
truth and not merely in arguing a client's viewpoint.
Trade association rules provide many methods for selection of expert
arbitrators and provide devices which will assure impartiality and not
advocacy. These associations generally have panels of arbitrators com-
posed of leading experts in various trades and professions, whose honesty
is unimpeachable. From lists submitted to each party, impartial experts
satisfactory to both sides can be mutually selected, administrative details
being handled by the trade association. 8 It should be borne in mind
that the arbitrators are generally not chosen until after the dispute
arises, 9 but that the method of appointment may be agreed to long in
38. Cf. Rules II, IH and IV of the American Arbitration Tribunal for an excellent
system for thus assuring proper arbitrators and proper administration; the Y=si Booix
oF CommcIA ARBnATION (1927) sets forth many similar set-ups.
39. "Although the parties may exercise their right to name the arbitrators in the clause
at the time the contract is made, it is not desirable. Under the Arbitration Rules it Is
not encouraged, for the following reasons: (1) The names of the arbitrators, when fixed
in the clause, may make them part of the contract, and they cannot be removed or the
vacancy filled without the written consent of all the parties to the contract. (2) Persons
named in the clause may die or be absent or be otherwise unavailable at the time a
controversy emerges and the difficulty of choosing a successor in the heart of the con.
troversy is thereby increased. (3) The status of the arbitrators may have changed,
rendering them incompetent or, by reason of their changed relation to a party, open to
the suspicion of partiality. (4) The arbitration may be held in a place remote from the
residence of the named arbitrators, adding greatly to the expense and inconvenience of
their service. (5) The parties may have selected persons qualified to deal with one class
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advance. Hence the lawyer's task is to select and secure assent to the
method which will provide the best type of panel for his client's pur-
poses. If arbitration is wanted for real determination of fact or business
custom, every effort should be made to assure expertness and impartial-
ity. But in the few cases where compromise is wanted, this type of arbi-
tration is out of place.
Arbitrations even with expert impartial arbitrators will occasionally
result in a compromise. Herein lies an advantage of an arbitration over
a law suit in particular cases. Juries and judges are bound to find for
the plaintiff or defendant and can use "burden of proof" to satisfy their
consciences, appellate tribunals and rules of law. But arbitrators having
fairly determined on the facts that there is no real "right br wrong" may
render a fair decision in accord with business custom and business need.
For example: "The goods are somewhat inferior to sample, but the
buyer should accept them with an allowance of two cents a yard." In
these instances arbitration has not been used for compromise, but for
expert determination of fact, and as a result of this a just verdict has
been reached by means of compromise.
The actual choice of individual arbitrators is difficult, and presents
as a rule many problems which can be solved only by experience and
careful study of the individual facts and the individual personages in-
volved. There are, however, two incorrect notions more or less prevalent
which may be dispelled. It is generally supposed that, if one's client
belongs to one walk of life and the antagonist to another, a person in
the latter's category would make a "bad arbitrator" in a case involving
primarily the antagonist's actions. This is probably true if one's client is
totally wrong, but we are interested in controversies where counsel is
trying to reach a just solution by arbitration. A series of cases close to
the heart of the profession brings the point home. We have witnessed
innumerable arbitrations where, of all things, a lawyer was trying to
collect a fee from a business man. The lawyer and administering trade
association invariably advised the choice of an outstanding lawyer for the
arbitrator. The businessman and his counsel, the latter mirroring per-
haps the natural sentiments of the client, would have no lawyer to pass
on the dispute. And so the layman secured a layman for an arbitrator,
and the lawyer received an award much larger than he deserved in all the
cases. For he presented a mass of records of how much ize, a lawyer, did.
Pleadings apparently indicating days of work (which a lawyer-arbitrator
would have recognized as form-book copies), complicated memoranda
of law (which bore striking resemblance to a magnum opus of a last
of controversies, as for example, questions of quality whereas the controversy that arizes may
concern a wholly different question wherein the arbitrators named are not exprts." CODE
of AiBrmmrom: PRACTxSE AND PRocanm (1931) S0-Si.
1934]
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year's law review editor), many, many diary entries, and so forth, all
but overwhelmed the business arbitrator. In fact, he probably came
away with great respect for the profession. A well selected lawyer arbi-
trator would make short work of such matters. The complaining lawyer
would obtain his just due before the latter, but no more. None but a
professional man can accurately know what professional work means.
The same principle holds in all kinds of similar disputes; and the honesty
of the arbitrator, his professional standing, and knowledge of the trade
assure a fair result; 40 without such knowledge, it will not be obtained.
On the other hand, where the "facts" in question depend on conflicting
viewpoints, the choice of arbitrators is very difficult. A buyer arbitrator
will look quite differently at quality on a falling market than a seller
arbitrator, a factor will have a different viewpoint on customs of the
trade than will a manufacturer. In this type of case there tire few who
can free themselves from class consciousness which is bound to affect
their decisions. A "personally impartial" arbitrator from each class
should probably be chosen, with a neutral lawyer to make the third
member of the board in most instances.
If the case involves conflicting testimony of "event fact" as distin-
guished from "business fact," beware of the outstanding expert; he has
often lost the common touch, even as juries may have too much of that
feeling. Despite all the criticism of juries, a study of many arbitrations
has convinced the writer that outstanding business experts, valuable as
they may be in determining disputed fact when its solution depends on
knowledge of the trade, do not have the skill and finesse of many juries
when it comes to detecting a lie. Certainly a lawyer is their superior,
while a judge will in almost any case render a just and accurate verdict
as opposed to the guess which the expert will render. There is nothing
about a business expert's training or experience which should make us
expect that he should become an expert fact weigher. A business man
will almost invariably utilize the parole evidence rule to an extent un-
thought of by the strictest judicial mind; he will know no exception to
the written document under any circumstances. A caveat should ever
be present in choosing an expert arbitrator, and a really thoughtful an-
alysis of what type his case is must be made by counsel if his client's
rights are not to be prejudiced.
Many things must be considered in preparing a case before arbi-
trators. There are tricks of the trade, just as there are before juries,
40. An arbitrator is not disqualified because he is engaged in the same business or pro-
fession as one of the parties. Newburger, Henderson & Loeb v. Rose, 228 App, Div, 526,
240 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st Dep't, 1930), aff'd 254 N. Y., 546, 173 N. E. 859 (1930). But
the fact that he is totally ignorant in the field of dispute will not disqualify him either.
Ross v. German Alliance Insurance Co., 86 Kan. 145, 119 Pac. 366 (1911).
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judges or referees. Business arbitrators frown on technical objection,
like to question witnesses themselves, and counsel would do well to keep
himself in the backgound as much as possible-which means more thor-
ough preparation for the hearing than would otherwise be the case. The
client should be permitted to tell his own story uninterrupted, should
be questioned only after he has completed his tale, and only in vital
matters which he may have omitted. Moreover, it will prove profitable
to offer to let the arbitrators cross-examine one's witnesses. Another
point worth remembering is that expert witnesses are superfluous and are
likely to arouse the ire of the arbitrators; for experts, relying upon their
own judgment, feel themselves perfectly capable of telling what is going
on in the trade and judging business fact and business custom. In
fact, one of the real advantages of having an expert arbitrator is that it
eliminates the necessity of expert witnesses, counsels' energy being en-
tirely directed to seeing that the arbitrators obtain enough business
fact to render thereon their own expert opinion. Thus, samples of mer-
chandise should be preserved, and exhibited and emphasized. A wool
man will render a fairer verdict if he can see and examine the merchan-
dise, than if he merely hears about it; certainly a wine taster would
enjoy the sapidity of wine more than a description of its qualities. More-
over, when correspondence is significant, the client's entire file should be
presented. Business men are used to seeing whole files and not parts
of them; they are suspicious of carefully selected letters and will not
believe that counsel has kept others out because of an instinctive following
of strict rules of evidence which they are under no duty to observe.
They do not know the distinction between letterpress and carbon. An
opponent's objection to the submission of an entire file will not hurt one's
cause; many business arbitrators have such a cordial dislike of "the law"
that citation of authority is likely to react against the citing side.
Client's argument is more effective than his counsel's. Arbitrators pay
more attention to a good opening statement than to a closing argument.
Finally, the client can frequently give his counsel sound advice regarding
business logic which will appeal to lay judges far more than legal reason-
ing. On the whole, however, one can formulate no set rules; a combina-
tion of the individual case, the particular arbitrator and experience will
determine how to prepare and present an arbitration. This is perhaps
what makes the proper presentation and preparation of a case for arbi-
tration so difficult and intriguing.
Certain it is that arbitration lacks the simplicity we have learned to
attach to the sound of the word. Arbitration is a means, not an end.
As a word it connotes nothing, assures nothing, and promises nothing.
The great difficulty is that the sponsors of the alleged arbitration move-
ment have set it up as an end in itself. We have been led to think of
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it, and not the case which may or may not need it. Thinking of it in
general terms has led to support and opposition to arbitration in and of
itself, with concomitant meaningless opposition and meaningless propa-
gandization. But so long as the profession speaks of arbitration in terms
of generalized praise and damnation, it must be expected that our clients
will act on business editorials rather than on sound legal advice.
For the lawyer to resist the spread of arbitration would be as futile
as the ill-fated experiment of King Canute. Our primary task is to pro-
vide the business man with better courts and with legal methodology
which accord with his needs and modern conditions. But until we do so,
we must utilize our present tools to the best advantage. Arbitration is a
new piece of machinery, perhaps a temporary substitute, perhaps a per-
manent one, but a piece of machinery and nothing else. Our job is to
learn to utilize it along with our other tools in the most efficient way.
Legal tools should be accepted only after proper legal advice, and not
pounced upon willy-nilly by business men reacting to verbal tomtomery.
If the lawyer looks upon his case and not upon arbitration as the res,
and gives sound advice on this basis, balancing arbitration along with
all the other means available, he will perform a real service to his clients.
Business will become educated to the use of legal tools by lawyers, and
will utilize or reject this particular tool as necessity indicates. Having
thus been properly used and limited, arbitration will provide speed, pri-
vacy, economy, friendliness, and expert judgment; the paradox of court
compulsion will fast disappear, the number of awards vacated will di-
minish, and the technicalities under the modern arbitration acts will be.
come relics of the past.
[Vol. 44
